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INTERFERING WITH OTHERS  
– Re-configuring Ethnography  
as a Diffractive Practice
 
This essay will concern itself with what we – ethnologists or ethnographers by 
any other name – do. Not primarily “do” in terms of activities we undertake; 
we interview, we observe, we write, we send emails, we have coffee, we print 
stacks of paper, we structure administrative chores, we go to meetings, we 
apply for grants, etc. Rather, we want to address the “do” in terms of what we 
make, or bring into the world through ethnography. What is it that we through 
the combination of all of our practices bring into being? What is that bringing 
into being dependent on? And, how does it influence the world? The first step 
to addressing these questions is outlining ethnography itself and how we – the 
authors – choose to articulate it. Articulation, as articulated by Donna Haraway 
is a process of signifying and of putting things together, letting them be diverse 
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and maybe even in friction with one another and themselves.1 The concept 
connotes an on-going indeterminacy. The articulations made in research, we 
argue, should be allowed to be of a searching quality, as well as being relational 
and expressive. They should not excuse themselves, neither make greater 
claims than they can fulfill. They should never be conclusive.2
The roots of ethnography can be found in anthropology and the study of groups, tribes or villages located far from the ethnographer’s native environ-
ment. It has however transcended such localities and conventions. Today it is a 
way of doing research found in a multitude of disciplines, being performed in 
countless ways and places.3 The ways of articulating ethnography are thus many 
and varied, but often certain research practices are put forward as its defining 
features. There is no denying that certain sets of (often qualitative) methods and 
theories, entwined in an open-ended and experimental research endeavor, form 
the ideal articulation of ethnography.4 The way ethnography will be articulated 
in this essay does not presuppose certain methods but recognizes it more as a 
mode, or perhaps a mood, of being with what we research. In one way or another, 
an ethnographer is a person performing research through closeness and because 
of this, ethnography is a practice dependent on proximity.
Physical proximity might be the first kind of proximity to come to mind when 
one pictures an ethnographer performing participant observation or engaging in 
an interview, but the kinds of closeness involved in ethnography are multiple. 
It might be emotional closeness, stemming from the fact that relationships with 
people are part of what is being researched.5 It might be the kind of proximity 
that emerges when one immerses oneself in large quantities of research materi-
als.6 It might be a “critical proximity” where the ethnographer, even if physically 
distant, actively engages with and is entangled in processes of decision making.7 
It might be the kind of proximity that can put the ethnographer in harms way, 
physically as well as emotionally.8 Or, worse still, it might be the kind of close-
ness that makes a careless ethnographer hurt others.9 A worn cliché is that the 
ethnographer never is a neutral observer, like the proverbial fly on the wall, but it 
is nevertheless an understanding of our craft that rings true; doing ethnography is 
a way of interfering with the world. It has been argued – and we do not disagree 
1 Haraway 1992.
2 Sherry, Troilo & Deschenes 2006, p. 346f.
3 Clifford 1986, p. 10f; Davies 1999, p. 46; Pink, Horst, Postill, Hjorth, Lewis & Tacchi 2016, p. 2.
4 Gray 2003, p. 21; Latour 2005, p. 68; Pink 2009, p. 8; Pink et al 2016, p. 3.
5 Davies 1999, p. 91.
6 Illouz 2008, s. 16.
7 Forsemalm 2013; Birbak, Petersen & Jensen 2015, p. 283f.
8 Hume & Mulcock 2004, p. xi.
9 Cf. Ellis 2007.
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– that every kind of research is a way of interfering with the world in one way 
or another.10 However, the kinds of closeness involved in ethnography enact11 
the ethnographer as someone who not only affects the world, but who is also af-
fected by it in equal measure. Ethnography is more than an intellectual, logical 
or cognitive practice. It is dependent on the senses and on embodiment, on being 
with as much as thinking about people; culture; the world.12 In the words of 
Donna Haraway, we hold ethnography to be a way of “being at risk” through the 
inevitable entanglement of the hopes and aims of the researcher and the resear-
ched.13 This closeness, or at riskness, is what sets ethnography apart. Because of 
its relational qualities, it continuously needs to be articulated, conceptualized 
and re-configured.
Let us dwell for a moment on the concept of re-configuration and the work we 
intend it to do throughout this text. Once again turning to Haraway, we hold figu-
rations to be “performative images that can be inhabited”.14 Such images can be 
verbal as well as visual and are at the same time literal and figurative. Unlike Ha-
raway who primarily concerns herself with the figurations of technoscience we 
will turn our attention to one of the tropes employed to handle the proximities 
of ethnography; namely that of reflexivity. Adding the “re-“ to configuration sig-
nals that our intention is to interfere. To re-configure is to modify and substitute 
concepts in the ethnographic vocabulary, inspired by medical anthropologist An-
nemarie Mol.15 By replacing “ethnography” with “praxiography”, “performance” 
with “enactment” and “discourse” with “logic”, Mol aspires to keep some of 
the concepts’ original connotation while shedding theoretical discussions not 
pertaining to her research.16 Paying attention to such minutiae of the research 
practices is a strategy for composing better figurations and in doing so forcing 
the ethnographer to take responsibility for the work that concepts are expected to 
do, rather than taking refuge in convention. Finally, the “con-” of configuration 
highlights that this move is not done in isolation, but through coming together 
with theories, texts, our respective ethnographic fields and – as authors – each 
other. In the same vein as Latour offers composition as an alternative to critique, 
we aim to figure ethnography out as a practice of diffraction rather than as one of 
reflection in order for it to be “put to a different use”.17
10 Haraway 1988; Barad 2007.
11 Enactment in the way it is used here was first articulated by the medical ethnographer Annemarie 
Mol (2002) as a re-configuration of the performance and performativity theories developed by 
Erving Goffman and Judith Butler, articulating that the world itself becomes enacted through 
knowledge producing practices.
12 O’Dell & Willim 2015, p. 94f.
13 Haraway 1997, p. 190f.
14 Haraway 1997, p. 11.
15 See Lee 2012, p. 175.
16 Mol 2002; 2008.
17 Latour 2010, p. 474f.
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Kinds of Closeness
In anthropology, the strength of ethnographic analysis has been attributed to the 
ethnographer’s ability to “un-fit” into the surrounding environments, allowing 
for movement between empathic closeness and critical distance in relationship 
to the “other”.18 This has in turn made proximity and entanglement goals to be 
achieved. Within our own discipline, European Ethnology, many of the methods 
associated with anthropology have instead been used to examine phenomena 
within the researcher’s home country.19 It is far from rare for ethnologists to stu-
dy contexts where they themselves are at home, such as sub-cultural groups or 
minorities, and where the possibility to “un-fit” often is small. In turn, this has 
resulted in re-configurations of ethnographic methods as well as of ways of un-
derstanding proximity.20 The anthropologist Marilyn Strathern claims that this 
often leads to a heightened need for reflexivity since the ethnographer is unable 
to pose as the exotic and strange researcher.21 It has been argued that this kind of 
proximity need not be without advantages, but that it is dependent on the ethno-
graphers’ ability to make the familiar strange to the same extent as the strange is 
made familiar.22 However, any a priori decisions on what constitutes proximity, 
be it national belonging or sub-cultural interests, risk hiding other kinds of clo-
seness that emerge through the research process.23 The assumed necessity of re-
flective distance and abstraction as essential to knowledge creation, in turn hides 
the ways knowing is dependent on doing, on belonging and being at risk. Rather, 
meaningful proximity in each specific research project needs to emerge through 
the process and the situatedness of the ethnographic practice itself.
This leads us to our own ongoing dissertation projects and how these in their 
respective ways have made the trick of un-fitting problematic. Wiszmeg’s research 
is concerned with how matter, practical skills, knowledge and the ideology of 
guidelines for evidence based science intra-twine to enact objects and practices 
in transplantations research on Parkinsons’ disease.24 Discussing research, know-
ledge and evidence with researchers within cell biology and neurology turned 
her attention towards the knowledge produced in her own project. Wiszmeg’s 
own object of research is therefore partly her own co-enactment of knowledge 
together with her participants. Mellander examines the career paths of former 
students of European Ethnology and how they put their education to work out-
side of academia. Among the participants are former, current and, perhaps, future 
18 Macdonald 1993, p. 19
19 O´Dell 1999, p. 61; O’Dell & Willim 2011, p. 29.
20 O’Dell & Willim 2015, p. 92
21 Strathern 1987, p. 16.
22 Cf. Labaree 2002, p. 100; Hume & Mulcock 2005, p. xxii.
23 Cf. Birbak, Petersen & Jensen 2015, p. 274.
24 See Wiszmeg 2012; 2016
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colleagues, sharing their experiences of Ethnology and how the discipline has 
created twists in their respective roads through life. The shared use of analytical 
concepts for understanding life in- and outside of academia enacts Ethnology and 
its uses as that which simultaneously explains and is explained.25 The research 
project unfolds itself as a network that is entangled in several ways, e.g. socially, 
conceptually and institutionally.
We have chosen to use the term “participant” to denote those with whom we 
enact knowledge. In relation to the term informant – i.e. someone who informs 
about the world – the term participant is more vague and can encompass several 
ways of sharing and partaking through research. Even though the participants 
discussed in this text mostly are humans, the word participant could potentially 
be used in the same manner as the Latourian “actant”, articulating other ways 
of acting in the world than through humanness26. In both our empirical cases 
we have found that notions of proximity and distance, likeness and difference, 
become something that can only be treated as an analytical result of intra-actions 
with the participants. This being said, the entry into our respective dissertation 
projects is what afforded us the analytical breaking point leading us into this 
attempt at re-configuration. Since our ways of knowing the world overlap with 
those of our participants, we clearly needed concepts for addressing these episte-
mological proximities. Para-ethnography has been suggested by e.g. anthropolo-
gists Douglas Holmes and George Marcus as a term for describing the ethnogra-
phic study of those whose intellectual labor resembles the ethnographer’s own 
methods and analysis.27 While studies under the label of para-ethnography have 
much to teach us about the challenges of performing ethnography, we have cho-
sen to avoid the concept itself throughout this text. This is partly because of the 
ethnological tradition of studying “others” with whom we already share concep-
tual worlds – in the least through a shared language.28 Treating para-ethnography 
as something set apart from other kinds of ethnography seems to presume that 
ethnography by definition is the study of something inherently “other”, rather 
than the study-through-proximity argued for here. Partly, it is because we strive 
to adhere to the concept of symmetry employed in actor-network theory, where 
different kinds of participants are treated with the same vocabulary in order not 
to presume different kinds of agency.29 In short, setting certain kinds of ethno-
graphy apart beforehand goes counter to our endeavor of understanding how dif-
ferences come to matter. 
25 Cf. Mellander & Fagerström 2013.
26 Latour 1999b, p. 78; 2005, p. 42.
27 Holmes & Marcus 2008, p. 597; Jespersen, Petersen, Ren & Sandberg 2012, p. 6.
28 Cf. Löfgren 1996; Arvidsson 2001.
29 Callon 2012, p. 154f; Viveiros de Castro & Goldman 2012, p. 421.
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Other ways that proximity to our respective participants emerges could be articu-
lated as us all being academics, being some kind of researchers and as occupying 
jobs that would place us in the intellectual middle-class. These identity-marking 
categories inform our worldview and epistemic rationale in ways that make them 
resemble each other, even if not being identical. While such identity categories 
may be of importance for our relationships with participants and may subsequent-
ly inform analysis, they must always be interpreted as situational and relational to 
the current object of knowledge. Otherwise, we argue, they risk becoming purely 
introspective.30 In order to avoid telling the story of the researcher, rather than our 
common story with the participant, we need to ask ourselves when e.g. our (col-
lective) middle-classishness came to matter? Was it when we chose to study at the 
university? Or was it through our studies that we would become what could be 
referred to as middle class? And was this “category” activated, or enacted, in field-
work? In that case, when and how? Using un-situated identity categories as general 
explanations for behavior can be precarious if left unspecified or un-problematized 
in relation to the issues we claim it to affect. Categories like class, gender, sex, race, 
ethnicity, age or functionality should ideally not be used as ready-made matrices. 
They can, in a worst-case scenario, be used for explaining behavior in a causal and 
essentializing manner, cementing stereotypes. 
The thing that brings us together as authors of this text is the question of 
how one can understand ways of knowing with participants in a place where 
we are not strange, not yet the same. This problem is no way exclusively tied to 
the kinds of entanglements described above. As already stated, they do however 
compel new ways of figuring, which is often the case when ethnography travels 
into new fields of inquiry.31 Addressing the questions of proximity, closeness 
and sameness leads us towards reflexivity – the ethnographic form of inquiry 
employed to map the ways in which subjectivity takes place in the research and 
in the world.32 However, as we shall see, the logic of reflexivity does not necessa-
rily conform to the notion of mutual or entangled enactments of knowledge, thus 
calling for a re-configuration in the shape of a diffractive approach.
A Turn to Reflexivity
Through the post-modern or reflexive turn, previous positivist ambitions within 
ethnography were put aside. Ethnographers were encouraged to scrutinize the re-
presentations created through research and the ways in which their own experi-
30 Ehn & Klein 1994, p. 11f; Gunnemark 2011b, p. 248.
31 Ren & Petersen 2013, p. 99.
32 Dowling 2008, p.747f; Beckman 2011, p. 231.
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ences gave shape to them.33 The reflexive project soon grew to encompass the ways 
in which power gives shape to research, be it in the meeting with the “other” or in 
the implicit political motivations that set things in motion.34 Critical voices raised 
within feminist as well post-colonial studies further contributed through concepts 
such as standpoint theory and intersectional analysis, articulating the complex in-
terdependencies of power and how positions of subjugation allows for the world to 
be known fuller and fairer.35 In short, the turn towards reflexivity can be said to be 
a turn for the better; giving better account of the conditions of doing ethnography; 
exploring and taking responsibility for what ethnography and ethnographers do 
in the world in a better way; striving for better lives for the sometimes subjugated 
participants in research. It is in the light of and thanks to the history of Anthropo-
logy and Ethnology that we are able to be part of the development of the disciplines 
into future versions.36 We are historical products, in debt to what we perceive as 
positive as well as more negative traits of what has come before. But new turns of-
fer other ways of thinking and making things better.
Regardless of how the current “turn” in theory is named, i.e. post-humanist, 
ontological, material, material semiotic, affective – and on it goes, one thing that 
follows with it is that knowing is as dependent on the coming together of things, 
places and feelings as it is on language.37 Recalling Donna Haraway’s concept of 
situated knowledges, her cyborg theory and the figuration of companion species, 
as well as the Deleuzian agencement by the way of sociologists Michel Callon 
and Donald MacKenzie; the apparatus in the agential realism of Karen Barad, 
the enactment of Annemarie Mol and the actor-network theory and sociology of 
translations of Latour – all ascertaining that the knower can never be singular 
and knowing is not an activity enacted in isolation, but through convergence and 
composition38. In recent years the writings of theorists within the field of Science 
and Technology Studies have become greatly influential within European Eth-
nology, our home discipline.39 Within the discipline this has reinvigorated the 
study of material culture; a long tradition that took a place in the backseat in 
the wake of the post-modern or linguistic turn.40 Drawing on these influences, 
Jespersen, Petersen, Ren and Sandberg suggest that cultural analysis should be 
33 Clifford 1986; Gunnemark 2011a, p. 19
34 Davies 1999; O’Dell 1999.
35 Lykke 2003.
36 Winther Jørgensen 2002, p. 40f
37 Cf. Åsberg 2012, p. 12.
38 Haraway 1988, 1991, 2003; Callon 2005; MacKenzie 2009; Barad 2007; Mol 2002; Latour 2005.
39 In swedish Ethnology, various STS-influenced approaches have been employed by e.g. Gustavsson 
2014; Göransson 2012; Knuts 2006; Forsemalm 2007; Frihammar 2010; Petterson 2007. These 
theories have also been put to good work by our danish colleauges, e.g. Damsholt, Simonsen & 
Mordhorst 2009; Munk 2010; Ren 2009; Petersen 2011. This is further elaborated upon in Ren & 
Petersen 2013.
40 Cf. Munk & Jensen 2015, p. 37.
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understood as a form of intervention; a view that we sympathetically share.41 The 
notion of intervention, we argue, implies that research disturbs and interferes 
what is being studied. Given that knowing is something that is done together 
with people, things, animals, theories, media materials – the list can go ever on – 
the world which we try to know is not distant but at our metaphorical fingertips.
Following this train of thought down the tracks leads to a place where reflec-
tion – the critical examination of the researchers’ role – may be found philoso-
phically lacking. The figuration of reflexivity, based on the optical metaphor of 
reflection, upholds a strong subject – object divide, conjuring up images of seeing 
oneself in a mirror. Alternatively, it evokes the pensive thinker immersed in in-
tellectual labor. Neither image seems to fit well with notions of intervention, in-
terference and disturbance. The reflexive agenda was introduced as a way of ad-
dressing that there is no such thing as “mere” description and that the researcher 
is responsible for the knowledge produced. But if the knower is never just the 
ethnographer herself and knowing is done in concert there is room and perhaps 
need for other concepts that challenge how the “self” comes to matter in research. 
While holding on to the matters of concern raised through reflexivity we strive to 
figure new ways of thinking and making research better.
Displacing the same elsewhere
It is safe to say that whatever the intentions and no matter the outcome, reflexi-
vity is a figuration where seeing the reflection of ourselves is the basis for at all 
being able to question our positions and the worlds seen from them. This extends 
to encompass both the individual researcher, but more often and just as well, 
the scholarly guilds of ethnologists and anthropologists.42 But, if reflexivity has 
served us – ethnographers – well, why do we – the authors – feel the need to 
interfere with it?
In “worst practice” the reflexive project of self-examination runs the risk of 
becoming little more than autobiographical accounts dispersed throughout the 
ethnographic material.43 The confessional character of such articulation does 
little to explore the ways in which power emerges through the research process, 
merely stating that it is something that one should be aware of. Alternatively, re-
flexive examination can become too introspective, turning the curious gaze from 
the “other” to the ethnographer, leaving little room for theoretical or methodolo-
gical development.44 While these extremes do not manifest themselves in ethno-
41 Ren and Sandberg 2012.
42 Cf. Winther Jørgensen 2002, p. 38, 40.
43 Winther Jørgensen 2002, p. 36.
44 Macdonald 1993, p. 18.
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graphies by necessity, the reflexive figuration does manifest a circular as well as 
an ocular logic. This turns the world and our place in it into something that can 
be seen, as if from a distance.45
What has been dubbed as “radical reflexivity” also tends toward a relativism 
that leaves all knowledge claims equal and abdicates responsibility through self-
exposure.46 According to Haraway, a relativist claim to knowledge is in equal 
measure a way of performing the “god-trick” as the claim for detached objec-
tivity in positivist science.47 Both traditional positivist views that hold objec-
tive knowledge as something non-situated and eternal, and a radical reflexivity 
that position knowledge as entirely subjective and the “other” as well as any 
possible world “out there” as inaccessible tend to obscure the circumstances of 
knowledge production. And worse still, the latter runs the risk of making seem-
ingly innocent knowledge claims about the world. Total relativism obscures the 
knower, letting knowledge stem from everywhere and nowhere in particular, all 
at once. As such it is an abdication of responsibility for the world brought into 
being through scientific research. Instead, Haraway argues for strong, situated 
knowledge in research.48
In striving to avoid radical relativism as well as God-eyed positivism, situated 
knowledge as well as so-called standpoint theory can be said to lean toward a 
realist stance in science theory. This can allow qualitative researchers to trace 
causal relations since it builds upon the crucial claim that all that is real and 
exists needs to be manipulable.49 While such descriptions might primarily turn 
associations towards materiality, it might just as well be transferred to language, 
concepts and figurations, cutting across the purification of matter from meaning; 
nature from culture. In the word of gender theorist Kathrin Thiele “[…] concepts 
are not abstractions from the world, but an active force of this world […]”.50
The branch of realism often referred to as “critical realism” has made an im-
portant contribution in reinstalling a non-subjective world with which we can 
interact, back into the post-modern research landscape. As such, critical realism 
has been put forward as a possible onto-epistemological foundation for ethno-
graphic research.51 Still, this line of thinkmaking research does not mainly con-
cern itself with the compositeness of the knower. Drawing a sharp line between 
relativism and realism is also a precarious move. While we might not subscribe 
to a total or radical relativism, we most certainly share the Geertzian stance of 
45 Schneider 2002, p. 469.
46 Ibid.
47 Haraway 1992.
48 Haraway 1988, p. 583f.
49 Maxwell, 2012, p. 33ff.
50 Thiele 2014, p. 203.
51 Cf. Davies 1999; Öhlander 2011, p. 25.
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being anti anti-relativists.52 As Latour helpfully reminds us via STS scholar Da-
vid Bloor, the opposite of relativism is absolutism, not realism.53 We exist in 
relation to and with the world, forming what Latour calls a “relative relativism 
(or relationism)”.54
If the knowing subject is always multidimensional and partial, incomplete, 
composite and situated, it is allowed to turn its gaze along the lines of “others” 
without making claims of inhabiting their position. To explore the knower is thus 
not a question of mapping out identities, but of situating relations. Situated know-
ledge can in other words never be traced to an individual – if we stipulate that 
such a creature exists. The knower is always collective, which means that the only 
way of truly seeing, or knowing, is to be situated, contrary to the claims of God-
eyed positivists.55 Physicist, feminist and philosopher Karen Barad follows and 
furthers Haraways reasoning on reflexivity, which she views as founded upon re-
presentationalism: “Reflexivity, like reflection”, she says, “still holds the world at 
a distance”.56 Like the surface of calm water, it reflects and rather than interfere. 
In this sense it “displaces the same elsewhere”, according to Haraway, figuratively 
hindering the researcher to see the participants behind the mirror with which s/
he is being composite. Since the reflexive presupposes a pre-existing split between 
subjects and objects, it is a purification of the world far from the entangled exi-
stence conceptualized by Barad as “agential realism”. Taking the stance of critical 
realism, the kind of causality that the qualitative researcher would have access to 
would presumably be linear and found in action between discrete objects, subjects 
and concepts that are already defined.57 If we instead choose to understand the 
knower as composite, partial and always entangled – in accordance with agential 
realism – causality cannot be understood in this way. Barad instead builds her phi-
losophy on a figuration that, like reflection, is appropriated by Haraway from the 
world of physics; diffraction.58 Unlike reflection, this figuration has its focus set on 
the emergence of interference and disruption.
Figuring Diffraction
Haraway’s proposed use of diffraction articulates her ambition to study the ways 
in which differences emerge through scientific study, rather than putting all the 
52 Geertz 1984.
53 Latour 1999b, p. 20.
54 Latour 1999a, p. 120.
55 Haraway 1988, p. 586.
56 Barad, 2007, p. 87.
57 Maxwell, 2012, p. 33ff.
58 Haraway 1992; Barad 2007.
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light on the researcher.59 While reflection denotes the process of light bouncing 
off objects, returning to its original source albeit in a weaker state, the concept of 
diffraction is used to describe how waveforms spread out and become distorted 
when encountering an object. An ocean wave passing through a narrow passage 
or a beam of light passing through a thin slit will not be reflected, but will spread 
out and create patterns emanating outwards. Letting such patterns overlap will 
in turn create interference; like when two stones are dropped into a pond of still 
water and the subsequent ripples merge, reinforcing some waves while cancel-
ling others out. Likewise, a beam of light passing through parallel slits will dif-
fract and create a pattern of interference. Where the wave patterns coincide and a 
crest meets another crest or a through meets a through, light becomes intensified 
and constructive interference is achieved. Where the patterns superpose but are 
opposite, when the crest of one wave meets the through of another, destructive 
interference can be observed where the light is diminished or even blotted out. 
If projected onto a screen, such interference manifests as intermingling fields of 
light and darkness, illuminating some point while leaving others in darkness. 
Changing one parameter in an experimental setup, like the distance between the 
slits, will lead to new patterns and thus difference. 
Thinking along these lines – or waves, as it were – knowledge no longer needs 
to be understood as a result of reflection or as something stemming from straight 
lines of sight, but rather as something emerging through disruptive processes. 
Proximity or distance comes to matter as different patterns of figurative dark-
ness and light, allowing for contrast that lets the world be known. This way the 
“other” is not figured as a mere surface of reflection, instead letting us think of 
them as sources of light and makers of waves in and of themselves. 
The making of difference in the world, ways of letting it be known, thus be-
comes a question of cutting through its a priori entanglement with the apparatus 
of research according to Barad.60 That division takes place is necessary for the 
enactment of the world, but exactly how and where it takes place, is dependent 
upon the knowledge producing circumstances; the apparatus. An apparatus can 
take the shape of an experimental setup as the one described above, but Jesper-
sen, Petersen, Ren & Sandberg suggest that it might just as well be enacted as cul-
tural analysis or ethnographic practice. Because of the entangled state of things 
there can be no external positions and thus no intervention, only intra-vention; 
no interaction, only intra-action.61
As Barad states, “diffraction is not about any differences, but about which 
differences matter”62, and how these differences also (seemingly paradoxically) 
59 Haraway 1992, p. 30.
60 Barad 2007, p. 140.
61 Jespersen, Petersen, Ren & Sandberg 2012, p. 9.
62 Barad 2007, p. 378.
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makes visible the entanglement of everything. Unlike reflection, diffraction does 
not presuppose a state of being where subjects and objects simply “are”, but ra-
ther makes it possible to account for how they are enacted by socio-material prac-
tices in time-space. It is not a question of how the role of the researcher or the 
researched is being “performed” or “constructed”, but how we enact the world 
itself together-apart.63 As the relationship of the researcher and the researched 
change, so does the interference pattern. Thus knowledge is dependent on align-
ment and directedness with the “other” and ethnographers need to take great 
care when constructing and tuning their apparatuses in research. Of course, the 
apparatus is not solely dependent on the researcher, considering the assertion 
that the researcher is never “sole”. However, figuring the ethnographic toolbox 
as an apparatus helps us understand the responsibility we bear not only for the 
scientific solidness of methods, theories and accounts, but for making fair cuts. 
The ethnographic apparatus can in itself be employed for analyzing apparatuses 
– a meta-apparatus of sorts – something that has decisively been demonstrated 
within the field of Science and Technology Studies.64 This is what the ethnogra-
pher can achieve when s/he attentively accounts for the cuts that matter for the 
object of study and the research question at hand. 
Searching together-apart; to hold and be held
In Barad’s agential realism the division that cuts “together-apart” creates diffe-
rence and makes the world knowable through its entanglements. It decides what 
is what, and what is not. To further figure the specificity of such cuts, Barad uses 
an example from the physicist Niels Bohr: If a person in a dark room holds a 
cane, it can be intra-acted with it in two mutually exclusive ways. By holding the 
cane firmly, the person can use it to navigate the room and the cane essentially 
becomes an extension of the person. If the person instead holds the cane loosely, 
its features can be felt, turning the cane into something that can be examined in 
itself.65 Similarly, we figure the ethnographer’s relation to the participants as a 
way of enacting the world collaboratively or as a way of subjugating the partici-
pants to the researcher's critical gaze. Agential cuts are sometimes made to cut 
us together, sometimes to cut us apart. While the researcher has a final say in 
what becomes part of the research report, one should also take into consideration 
how the participants hold the ethnographer “tightly” or “loosely”, what kind of 
knowledge they gain and what they can set in motion by doing so. Needless to 
63 Barad 2007, p. 179.
64 Cf. Latour 2005.
65 Barad 2007, p. 154.
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say, this becomes increasingly important when the participants themselves know 
the tricks of the trade. 
If we can at all presuppose a boundary between ethnographer and “other”, we 
must remember that the ethnographer is not only holding, but is also being held. 
Much like the ethnographer, the participants will use the research situation to 
further explore the world surrounding them, together as well as apart. As shown 
by Vikkelsø the ethnographer may encounter many kinds of resistance as well as 
willingness to align with research projects.66 Presupposing the intentions of such 
interference or prescribing it to Theory writ large should preferably be avoided. 
Instead, it is the mapping out of these cutting together/cutting apart through spe-
ech acts as well as other practices that can become a source of analytical move-
ment for diffractive thinkmaking.
When neither studying “subjugated” subjects, nor really studying “up”, po-
wer structures does not seem to appear along the lines most often stipulated. 
This calls for us as researchers to try and ask new questions. Most often, the “site 
of power” in ethnographic work has been localized and analyzed at critical di-
stance, in the sense that the ethnographer – no matter what kind of proximity is 
enacted during fieldwork – still is apart and different from the subjects of study. 
Workings of power might not come in the same shape and size from a diffractive 
point of view as it presumably does in a reflexive account. This does not mean 
that power is not enacted, only that we try hard not to presume or localize its pro-
duction and producers before figuring them out; before we enact an agential cut.
To avoid essentializing partial perspectives into stereotypes of single and one-
dimensional categories, an intersectional take on identities have shown to be 
helpful in many disciplines. This stance has been extremely valuable in unco-
vering the complexities of how the structures upholding unfair conditions work 
to exploit and repress certain people more than others, due to specific compo-
sitions of orientations, proximities and affinities. As outcomes of ethnographic 
work, intersecting “identity categories” have much to contribute. The problem 
for us, the authors, is that the philosophical foundations upon which they rest 
are hard to reconcile with the diffractive approach argued for here. As an alterna-
tive, figuring intrasections instead of intersections, allows for single or multiple 
differences (or affinities, proximities and orientations) to be cut out in each given 
situation. Instead of treating “identity categories” as separate and intersecting as 
an analytical and political move,67 intrasectionality allows them to be enacted 
out of the specific socio-material practices at hand, and to be situational and 
compositional. Such a procedure better acknowledge the fact that they cannot 
all be said to be existing a priori in any given situation. This in turn, we argue, 
66 Vikkelsø 2007, p. 308.
67 Cf. Gunnarsson 2015.
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also better allows for possible not-yet-seen identities and species to matter.68 As 
representing the “other” is a risky power move, we prefer to think of the ethno-
grapher’s duty as one of fair articulation.69 The words formed by the researcher 
are not representations of the world, imperfectly reflecting it “as it is”. By articu-
lating them, we are actively making concepts such as culture come to matter. No 
matter how modest its claims, description is always intervention.70
Diffractive practices 
One way of performing diffraction suggested by Haraway as well as by Barad71, 
is to read and re-write text through each other. A recent scholar practicing this 
is Melanie Sehgal72 who made a reading of the process theories on becoming by 
Alfred North Whitehead73 with the diffractive approaches of Haraway and Barad. 
Other researchers who have attempted and discussed a diffractive approach to 
ethnographic practice are Hillevi Lenz Taguchi,professor of child- and youth stu-
dies, as well as educational scholars Alecia Y. Jackson and Lisa A. Mazzei. The 
former argues that as a researcher one is uncovering one possible reality among 
many not yet diffracted ones. Making oneself aware of imaginary and bodymind 
sensibilities in composing and analyzing data, is a crucial move.74 It is a call for 
cognizing and imagining, in contrast to reflecting and interpreting – a becoming-
with and a diffracting-from. 
For Jackson and Mazzei diffraction becomes a way to through an interview 
map out how a black woman teaching at a primarily white university “intra-act 
with the materiality of [her] world in a way that produce different” becoming.75 
They conclude that it is not her blackness that diffracts her as different, but that 
it is the “intra-action of bodies, discourses and institutions do so”.76 They argue 
that blackness, and the concept of race in itself, is enacted by these intra-actions. 
Much effort is put into describing material as well as social circumstances of the 
interviews. Taguchi as well as Jackson and Mazzei argue that the benefit of a dif-
fractive approach may not always be the conclusion of what is different, but the 
findings of how and in which ways it is.
68 Cf. Haraway 1991.
69 Haraway 1992.
70 Vikkelsø 2007, p. 306.
71 Haraway 1992; Barad 2007
72 Sehgal 2014
73 Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) was a philosopher and mathematician, and is considered 
to be a pioneer of process philosophy, which concerns itself with the process (and ontology) of 
becoming.
74 Taguchi 2012, p. 275.
75 Jackson & Mazzei 2012, p. 119.
76 Jackson & Mazzei 2012, p.125.
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The accounts do however leave us wanting something more. In a way, their con-
clusions appear quite predictable. Naturally, we cannot always expect the pro-
cess of uncovering power to be surprising in itself, but some expressions of op-
pression we already know quite well. What one can do as ethnographers is to 
try to work the diffractive approach into the designs of our ways of inquiry and 
not only employ it as an analytical afterthought. This may better facilitate inter-
ventional accounts, where the knowledge composed enacts and articulates the 
agency of the participants, in for them beneficial ways. Haraway’s claim that et-
hnographical inquiry is a way of being at risk77 combined with Latour’s claim that 
ethnographers should give their participants “leeway in defining themselves”78 
affords us an additional train of thought. Not only might ethnography benefit 
from being re-configured as a diffractive practice; the figuration of diffraction 
might also stand to gain something when given shape through ethnography.
In the beginning of this essay we established that the ways of practicing et-
hnography are manifold and many are the methods that could potentially be 
configured with diffraction. We would however like to claim affinity with the 
four guidelines for performing “critical proximity” drawn by Birbak, Petersen 
& Jensen all of which point towards the open-endedness of ethnography.79 The 
first is to hesitate before adopting a stance of critical distance, in the sense that 
grand narratives of clashing ideologies should not be the first stop when looking 
for analytical leverage. These may obscure descriptions of the micro-processes of 
everyday life. The second one follows closely on the first, regarding the purifica-
tion of categories as something that needs to be explored in empirical cases rather 
than as existing analytical resources. Put simply this means that one should avoid 
premature statements of what things in the world are really about. Patterns of dif-
ference that cut phenomena as “culture”, “nature”, “economy” or “technology” 
apart should be traced and not presumed.80 The third is to allow new roles for 
and relationships for researchers and participants to emerge through the process 
of research. To know, the researcher needs to align and ally with participants, 
knowing with them rather than about them. Finally they call for an appreciation 
for new positions for methods and an acceptance in face of the fact that research 
methods permeate society. No longer can methods be seen as the sacred tools of 
academia, jealously guarded from use in the world “outside”. Methods travel and 
as researchers we need to follow the ways in which they adapt and are adapted in 
new places, rather than strive for methodological purity.81 In sum, the guidelines 
of Birbak, Petersen & Jensen encompass the ontological force of research and its 
77 Haraway 1992, p. 190f.
78 Latour 2005, p. 41.
79 Birbak, Petersen & Jensen 2015.
80 Petersen & Munk 2013, p. 106.
81 Birbak, Petersen & Jensen 2015, p. 289f.
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ethical implications. The path to reach a critical state lies not within theoretical 
abstractions or in wedges driven between essentializing categories, but in the 
scrutiny and making of these same frames.82 While not constituting be-all and 
end-all of a diffractive re-configuration these guidelines could in our opinion 
serve as a point of departure.
While we do not wish to make any grand claims to methodological innovation, 
there are several practical techniques of performing ethnography that fall well 
within the lines drawn above. One example is employing methods that place cri-
tical inquiry in the hands of the participants – human or otherwise – rather than 
performing it as a second-hand, after-the-fact, analytical move.83 If the practice 
of interviewing is understood as a way for participants to enact ethnographies 
of their own lives, the task of the ethnographer is to device forms of inquiry that 
strengthen those enactments.84 In our own research, allowing participants to read 
and comment on transcripts from previous conversations with the researcher has 
been one way of making the shared analytical qualities of ethnographic inter-
views more explicit. Other such strategies include performing walk-along inter-
views in the participants’ workplaces, discussing documents authored by the 
participants – ranging from job applications to institutional strategy statements 
to regulatory documents in biomedicine – and collecting diaries listing tasks 
performed at work.85 In this way, critical analysis becomes a question of proxi-
mity and engagement rather than distance, as nuance and ambiguity is enacted 
together-apart in the interview. Using maps as a visual aid has been suggested as 
another a strategy for letting the participants themselves unfold their entangle-
ments by figuring themselves “in relation to other actors”.86 Finally, the tinkering 
and tweaking of research concepts can in itself be a way of doing diffracting. By 
figuring in new ways, we make new things and compose new knowledge.87 The 
ways we think about and articulate ethnographic practice are not divorced from 
the practices themselves and whether we claim that ethnography reflects, accu-
mulates, composes, renders or diffracts there will be consequences.88 Re-configu-
ring ethnography as a diffractive rather than a reflexive practice is therefore not 
an attempt to establish canonicity, but an attempt to let some of the ethnographic 
open-endedness extend to its own concepts and practices. 
82 Birbak, Petersen & Jensen 2015, p. 281; Latour 1999a.
83 Cf. Birbak, Petersen & Jensen 2015, p. 280.
84 Cf. Mol 2002, p. 28; Mol & Law 2004, p. 59.
85 Cf. Kusenbach 2003, p. 464; Davies 1999, p. 172; Czarniawska 2007, p. 90.
86 Jensen, Munk, Madsen & Birbak 2014, p. 239.
87 Cf. Mol & Law 2004, p. 59; Woolgar & Lezaun 2013, p. 333.
88 O’Dell & Willim 2015, p. 91.
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Diffracting the ethnographic thinkmaking
This essay has been an attempt at diffraction along a reflexive/diffractive cut in 
ethnographic thinkmaking89, examining in what ways other figurations allows 
for other ways of enacting the world. We wanted to discuss and problematize the 
philosophical foundations upon which the conceptual apparatus of reflexivity 
rests and instead ask; what happens if we do not presume difference but rather 
choose to look to how it is enacted? Difference and nuances is what makes the 
world knowable. Without them, it – and we – would be a homogenous mass. 
By putting emphasis on what is set in motion and what waves are being made 
by doing ethnographic research, we believe it helps both researcher and parti-
cipant to better understand and appreciate the ripple effect achieved by their 
relationship. It is also a way to more concretely and straightforwardly make sense 
of and accept the interference effects that ethnographers have agreed occur in all 
research anyway – indifferent to conceptions of reflexivity or diffraction. The 
crucial difference is that one can avoid taking the reflexive detour and instead 
look directly at the reality effects of ethnographic fieldwork. 
If knowing is composite and the thought is distributed, then the subjective 
self is always enacted and cut out in and by the research practice. Not arguing 
that one should do diffractive ethnography instead of reflexive, we rather sug-
gest that doing ethnography is in itself more of a diffractive practice. In the same 
manner that Latour’s90 assertion that “critique has run out of steam” does not 
preclude critical thought, this essay does not call for a ban on reflective thoughts 
about one’s own role and position as a researcher. However, we do not find the 
philosophical underpinnings of the reflexive project to fit well with ethnographic 
practice, nor with its aim of making fair accounts. 
As stated in the introduction, we address “doing” in terms of what we make, 
or bring into the world through ethnography. By re-configuring ethnography as a 
diffractive practice, we believe that we can better conceptualize such a bringing 
into being and what it is dependent upon. For further figurings of ethnography as 
diffractive, we would pose some questions that might achieve the wished for rip-
ple effect; When and how do our participants and we enact the same or different 
objects, concepts or subjects? What unexpected ones emerge? How are they cut 
together-apart? How and when are we cut together-apart with our participants? 
And, what kinds of closeness and proximities – or distances and differences – do 
these cuts enact, pertaining to our research questions? We have hereby given 
some clue to how diffraction can serve as a tool for figuring distance differently, 
while not obscuring proximity. If we, ethnographers, are to write about the lives 
89 Cf. “thought-practice”, as elaborated on by Thiele, 2014
90 Latour 2004.
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of people, we must carefully consider the tools at hand for shedding analytical 
light on lived experiences. One of them being metaphors, concepts, words, and 
how these can be better put to work to reflect, or diffract, our research practices. 
Maybe it is not only time to shed light. It may be time to shed the ocular me-
taphors of the observer altogether and instead make waves. What we argue for in 
conclusion is not that diffraction is better than reflexivity, but that we perhaps – 
to once again paraphrase Bruno Latour91 – have never been reflexive.
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English abstract 
In this essay we investigate ways to re-configure ethnographic practices and ar-
ticulate them as diffractive. The essay problematizes the ways in which the phi-
losophical concept of reflexivity can be understood as limiting for the inherent 
compositional character of ethnographic practices. These practices are by neces-
sity carried out in proximity. That makes a reflexive point of departure problema-
tic, since it as figuration presupposes a certain amount of distance to that which 
is studied. We present the concept of diffraction, as introduced by Donna Hara-
way and elaborated upon by Karen Barad, and discuss its possible philosophical 
as well as practical implications for ethnographic practices. We review examples 
of scholarly attempts at a diffractive ethnographic practice, as well as attempts 
at re-configuring ethnography through proximity by the way of other figurations. 
The essay takes departure in our experiences of doing ethnographic fieldwork in 
our respective doctoral studies, concerning different aspects of knowledge pro-
duction in the fields of cell biology, neurology and in ethnology, in contemporary 
Sweden. 
